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The public sector in Pacific island countries
is usually of critical importance, with public
expenditure accounting for a large part of
each country’s GDP. Therefore, the quality of
public expenditure management (PEM)
systems is an important determinant of their
economic prosperity. However, despite
considerable efforts to reform public financial
management systems in the Pacific island
countries in the past decade, they remain
plagued with many problems in dealing with
the three objectives traditionally attributed
to the budget, that is, aggregate fiscal
discipline, allocative efficiency and technical
efficiency (World Bank 1998a; Diamond
2003).
The reforms attempted since the 1990s
have relied heavily on external technical
assistance, and have often tried to import
cutting-edge PEM techniques that had
been developed in Australia and New
Zealand. However, these reform attempts
have often proved disappointing, perhaps
predominantly because they were not
suited to local capacities and institutions.
Budgetary ‘best practices’, such as the
delegation of decision making power and
performance orientation, are conceptually
aimed at improving public outcomes. But,
like all models, they should be implemented
with care, taking account of domestic
constraints. A good analysis of the local
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setting is therefore necessary in order to
identify what PEM reforms are potentially
fruitful. The prioritisation of reforms is even
more important, considering the lack of
financial and human resources in the Pacific
island countries.
This article discusses how the principal-
agent theory of economics may provide a
suitable analytical framework and interesting
lessons for the targeting of PEM reforms in
small economies like the Pacific island
countries. It deliberately does not focus on
the technical details, but tries to give an
intuitive idea of the main results from the
theory and their application to PEM realities.
The article is structured around key
questions. It first presents the principal-agent
theory and then explains why it can be
usefully applied to PEM concerns. Some
characteristics of Pacific island countries are
presented, which should be included into the
analysis in order to reflect reality—possibly
departing from the models found in the
literature. A series of insights from the theory
are then presented, which may support the
prioritisation and sequencing of PEM
reforms.
What is principal-agent theory?
Principal-agent theory emerged in the 1970s
in opposition to neo-classical economics,
which essentially ignores incentive problems
and postulates that all economic agents are
perfectly informed.1 The principal-agent
theory tackles ‘agency’ problems emanating
from diverging interests and information
asymmetry between one (or several) agent(s),
who perform(s) tasks on behalf of another
self-interested party (the principal). Agents
may be of different ‘types’, according to their
characteristics, or because they are
confronted with different situations. The
relationship between agents and principals
is traditionally spelt out in a menu of
contracts specifying the transfer to be granted
to each type of agent, according to the output
produced. Two major types of information
problems may arise: (pre-contractual) hidden
information (for example about the agent’s
productivity or a firm’s cost function), which
gives rise to so-called adverse selection
problems; and (often post-contractual)
hidden actions (for example the agent’s effort,
or consumption of perquisites), which give
rise to moral hazard. In most models, the agent
possesses the informational advantage; but
some models deal with privately informed
principals. The fundamental agency problem
thus stems from the privately informed party
taking an unfair advantage of its superior
information in order to extract so-called
‘informational rents’. The principal-agent
theory searches for ‘second-best’ contracts;
that is, contracts that minimise agency costs
(whereas the ‘first-best’ allocation of
resources can only be reached under perfect
information). The theory has been applied in
several fields, such as insurance, delegation
of decision-making by shareholders to
managers, labour and agrarian contracts, and
the regulation of monopolies.
Agency problems may be mitigated in
two ways: either on an ex ante basis, by
providing the agent with the right incentives
and induce him to behave in the principal’s
interests—which generally takes the form of
informational rents (which, in some cases,
may refer to performance premiums); or, on
an ex post basis, through supervision and an
appropriate system of sanctions. It is often
optimal for the principal to rely on both types
of incentives.
The principal-agent literature considers
that the principal designs a menu of contracts
and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
agent(s), anticipating that he (they) will react
according to his (their) own best interest. The
principal’s problem is typically subject to two
sets of constraints. First, the ‘individual
rationality’ (or participation) constraints
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ensure that agents receive at least their
‘reservation utility’ (a minimum level of
utility), so that they are at least indifferent to
accepting the contract. Second, the ‘incentive
compatibility’ constraints ensure that it is in
the agents’ interest to act truthfully and not
to take unfair advantage of their private
information: because they are paid more
and/or because they face a penalty when
cheating. When the principal is able to
credibly commit to the terms of the contract,
a solution to finding the optimal contract is
through the use of the ‘revelation principle’
(Myerson 1979; Dasgupta, Hammond and
Maskin 1979). The commitment assumption
is necessary, because this solution technique
allows finding contracts that are ex ante
optimal, but are generally inefficient ex post
because they cause allocative inefficiencies.
When the principal is unable to commit not
to renegotiating the contract ex post, a
‘renegotiation-proofness’ constraint must be
added to the problem (see, for example,
Bolton 1990). The traditional results from
basic adverse selection models with
commitment are the following. The first-best
(full information) contract, grants agents
their reservation utility and they produce the
efficient output level (equating the marginal
cost of effort with the marginal value of its
product). Under asymmetric information, the
second-best solution entails granting an
informational rent to ‘efficient’ agents and
requiring ‘inefficient’ agents to under-
produce—hence the well known rent
extraction-efficiency trade-off.
The informational rent means that
incentive schemes rely on providing efficient
agents with superior transfers (above the
compensation of their effort) in order to
induce them into behaving truthfully (or not
cheating). However, incentive compatibility
constraints may be very costly to fulfil.
Therefore, other instruments may be used to
relax these constraints, such as supervision
and sanctions. The issue of supervision has
been studied within the framework of three-
tier hierarchy principal-agent models; that
is, relationships between one principal, one
agent and one supervisor (see, for example,
Baron and Myerson 1982; Baron and
Besanko 1984; Kofman and Lawarrée 1993;
and Khalil 1997). Such models rely on the
usual principles of the principal-agent
theory. If the principal cannot credibly
commit to an audit policy, audit must be ex
post optimal, which means that some
penalties must be collected to justify the cost
of audit, so that cheating and conviction
emerge at equilibrium. However, with
commitment, audit deters cheating and
relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint
ex ante, and will not be optimal ex post. The
decision to audit depends on the trade-off
between its costs and benefits; audit may be
used in conjunction with other incentives
(rents and distortions).
An important issue studied in recent
models involving supervision is the
possibility of collusion between the agent
and the supervisor. Technically, collusion
may be solved by adding a ‘collusion-
proofness constraint’ into the principal’s
problem in order to dissuade the supervisor
and the agent from colluding (Tirole 1986).
But the potential for collusion may cause the
principal to modify the contract (notably,
through granting the supervisor a rent), thus
further distorting economic activity.
Finally, it should be mentioned that two
types of principal-agent models are
encountered in the literature: static (one-
period) models and dynamic (‘repeated
game’) models. The latter often better reflect
reality by allowing emphasis on the further
costs and benefits due to the repetition of a
contract (for instance, even if the contract is
not optimal in the first period, it may be in
the interest of the actors to respect it, because
future gains are secured in subsequent
periods; cheating may thus be more easily
avoided in a repeated game). Repetition also
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allows the guarantee of, for instance, a certain
commitment to the terms of the contract,
because the relationship is valuable in the
long term. However, static models are often
sufficient for explaining the features of a
principal-agent relationship.2
Why is the principal-agent theory
applicable to public expenditure
management?
As it is mostly based on hierarchical
relationships with delegation of tasks, and
as information is asymmetric between the
different parties, the public sector has many
principal-agent relationships. One can think,
for instance, of the relations between the
parliament and the government, between the
Ministry of Finance and line ministries,
between central and decentralised
authorities, and the relationships within
these agencies.3 As an example, spending
agencies may be seen as agents of a superior
authority (representing the public interest),
as they are required to produce a certain
amount of output (public goods and services)
in exchange for their budgetary allocation.
This principal-agent relationship entails
both hidden actions (for example on the
agency’s ‘effort’, or possible corruption and
misspending) and hidden information (for
example on the ‘productivity’ facilitating or
hampering the provision of public goods
and services). Due to their better knowledge
of their sector and actions, spending agencies
have obviously the informational advantage
over the superior authority, which will
therefore want to control and provide
adequate incentives to its agents. The
principal-agent approach may thus be very
helpful in studying this kind of problem,
because it provides a set of tools to align
agents’ interests with their principal’s.
Leruth and Paul (2006) provide a formal
attempt to apply the principal-agent theory
to PEM issues. Their paper applies a standard
model with audit to the relationship between
a Ministry of Finance acting as the principal,
and a representative line ministry, acting as
the agent. The pair ‘expenditure program-
budget appropriation’ is thus viewed as the
two components of a contract between the
Ministry of Finance and the line ministry.
This simple model can be applied to various
PEM systems (for example relying on strong
internal controls, or more decentralised
systems), and allows for comparisons
between institutional settings. For instance,
they analyse the benefits derived from the
use by the Ministry of Finance of two control
instruments: ex post audits and ex ante
controls. Their value is assessed in terms of
their ability to deter cheating by the line
ministry at a reasonable cost. But often,
additional incentives, such as informational
rents, are necessary to deter cheating. A set
of possible ‘control regimes’ that can be used
by the Ministry of Finance are derived. The
choice of regime is determined by the agency
costs incurred by the Ministry of Finance—
these depend on a number of country-specific
parameters.
This principal-agent model of PEM
systems allows interpreting of corruption
and misspending as informational rents
captured by line ministries at the expense of
the principal.4 As an example, one can
imagine a situation where the Ministry of
Finance can observe the output produced by
the line ministry , but cannot disentangle the
factors that contribute to production—say,
the line ministry’s ‘effort’ (in terms of
programming and carrying out its activities),
its possible misspending or corruption, and
exogenous productivity factors—unless it
exerts some controls (for example, financial
and operating audits). Thus, a low output
could be explained by the line ministry’s
negative actions (low effort, misspending or
corruption) and/or by unfavourable
exogenous factors (for example, bad weather
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conditions, epidemics, or social unrest). An
agency problem occurs when exogenous
conditions are good, but as the line ministry
is the only one to know it precisely, it takes
an unfair advantage of its superior
information and ‘cheats’ (that is, slap-dash
work, spending in unproductive areas or
diverting monies), so that the final output is
low.5
The Ministry of Finance can use various
instruments to control line ministries and
prevent such cheating. It can use supervision
(audits to verify the line ministry’s actions
ex post, or ex ante controls—internal or
external—and monitoring to prevent it from
cheating before it chooses its actions) and
also incentive premiums. Indeed, the
informational rents referred to in the
principal-agent literature may be viewed, in
PEM practice, as kinds of performance
premiums (that is, rewards given in addition
to the compensation of inputs and effort, to
give an incentive to the agent for exerting a
higher effort). This interpretation also allows
one to link the principal-agent theory with
program and performance budgeting.
Finally, the choice of the appropriate mix
between the different types of control and
incentive tools should be based on efficiency
grounds; that is, by maximising the
effectiveness/cost ratios of these tools. This
approach is implicitly followed by principal-
agent models through the maximisation of
the principal’s problem.
Characteristics of Pacific island
countries
Theoretical studies, belonging in particular
to the principal-agent theory, but also to other
disciplines (for instance, political, social, and
administrative sciences), may be helpful in
the design of PEM institutions in the Pacific
island countries. However, the bulk of
theories and empirical studies on govern-
mental institutions have been developed in
the context of advanced Western countries.
A crucial lesson from experience, now
allegedly recognised in the discourse of the
international community, is that the blind
application of theoretical, ‘one-size-fits-all’
solutions is to be proscribed, and that policies
imposed from the outside—and not ‘owned’
by national constituencies—have little
chance of succeeding (see, for example, World
Bank 1998b). On the contrary, policies and
institutions should be adapted in order to
suit local settings and peculiarities—perhaps
especially in countries where ‘indigenous’
norms (Dia 1996) or informal constraints
(North 1990) largely diverge from official
norms inherited or imposed from outside.
Forgetting the country-specific
characteristics may lead to damaging
consequences. For example, the attempt made
by the Cook Islands to implement accrual
accounting and program budgeting quickly
showed the limits of the absorptive capacity
at the Ministry of Finance. With all the staff
available (and that is very few) busy trying
to implement the new budgeting rules,
bookkeeping virtually disappeared and
accounts were no longer produced (Leruth
2004).
The principle of modelling is to simplify
reality and to use restrictive assumptions.
However, Pacific island countries—and
more generally developing countries—are
subject to particular constraints, which are
important to take into account in designing
realistic models, and therefore should be
added to traditional models encountered in
the ‘western’ literature. Some important
constraints and characteristics of Pacific
island countries are presented below.
First, a series of special features arise
from the very small size of these economies,
such as high sensitivity to external shocks
(lack of resilience), weak absorptive capacity,
the crucial importance of the public sector in
the economy, the lack of resources and
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capacity, and very tight cash constraints. In
terms of PEM, the small size of the government
may make it easier to have a comprehensive
overview of public expenditure, but it also
comes with tight capacity and budget
constraints. Therefore, it is often argued that
small economies do not have sufficient
resources to implement and sustain substantial
reforms requiring a lot of highly skilled
human resources. Moreover, the shortage of
skilled human resources in the public sector
increases the opportunity cost of these
resources.
Second, the poor state of statistics, the
more general lack of reliable information, and
the general lack of transparency worsen
agency problems by increasing information
asymmetries between the various stake-
holders, and complicate the control of
governmental agents. Moreover, most Pacific
island countries are archipelagos composed
of remote islands, for which information is
very difficult to obtain on a real-time basis.
Third, the ineffectiveness of the legal and
judicial systems (combined with societal
characteristics) may undermine enforcement
mechanisms. In particular, it may be very
difficult to enforce civil servants’ financial
responsibilities. If contracts cannot be easily
enforced through a judicial procedure, the
value of ex post accountability mechanisms
is reduced, which calls for other types of
controls (say, ex ante controls) and/or self-
enforcing contracts.
This last point relates to a very interesting
feature of Pacific island countries, and more
generally of close-knit societies. In addition
to formal or official institutions, which have
often been inherited from colonial history or
external partners, Pacific island countries are
also characterised by informal, ‘indigenous’
norms and institutions. This informality
covers all segments of the economy and
public sector, from civil servant hiring to
budgeting (with an official budget, plus an
informal one that defines bills to be effectively
paid) and control (Schick 1998). Informality
is associated with high costs to the economy,
but in some instances helps contribute to
the public order. Therefore, in addition to
formal accountability systems, close-knit
societies like the Pacific island countries
are characterised by informal, indigenous
accountability systems, whereby people
have to comply with various obligations to
one another. In that vein, Dabla-Norris and
Paul (2006) introduce a ‘minimum require-
ment constraint’ into their analysis, on the
assumption that the relationship between
civil servants and the population is
informally ruled through a social consensus,
such that the population implicitly accepts
a certain degree of rent capture from public
agents, in exchange for them providing at
least a certain level of public goods. This
assumption is justified by empirical evidence
and seems to reflect the situation in many
developing countries. It therefore must be
taken into account in analysis of the public
functioning in Pacific island countries.
Finally, other features and constraints
further characterise Pacific island countries,
such as high dependence on aid flows,6 and
therefore attached conditionality and
externally imposed constraints; and the high
discount rate of economic agents, because of
high risk and cultural factors (preference for
the present).
Because of all these factors, public
management solutions designed in western
settings might not prove adequate in Pacific
island countries. In particular, the scarcity
of resources and capacity calls for cost-
effectiveness considerations. Moreover, as
PEM systems in Pacific island countries are
heterogeneous—they vary from highly
centralised (for example, Fiji) to highly
decentralised (for example, Micronesia)—
careful analysis should be undertaken in
order to elicit the most suitable reforms. These
constraints are important to keep in mind
throughout the rest of the article.
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What insights can agency theory
bring to PEM in the Pacific?
The list of PEM reforms needed in Pacific
island countries, based on a comparison with
international standards and best practice, is
probably very long (see, for example, Diamond
2003). However, serious constraints rule out
the possibility of implementing all recommend-
able reforms and forgetting these constraints
may have damaging consequences. The
principal-agent theory provides a useful
analytic framework within which to identify
the factors that are most likely to provide
appropriate incentives for agents, while some
needed reforms should be deferred until
further institutional changes are realised. We
extract some lessons from the principal-agent
theory to help define the most efficient PEM
systems according to local conditions and
constraints, and thus sequence reforms.
This article is limited to PEM systems, in
particular to the control of implementing
agents and agencies (say, line ministries) by a
superior entity, which represents the collective
interest. Very few papers have directly targeted
this issue. However, some results from
standard principal-agent models, in
particular those with audit, can support our
reflections, provided that they are adapted to
Pacific island country constraints. The rest of
the section is organised following a few key
themes.7
The value of ex post audits8
The value of audit lies in its ability to deter
cheating (and/or corruption in PEM
contexts) through the threat of being caught
ex post and incurring a penalty. From the
principal’s perspective, it is optimal to use
audit only if its benefits (in preventing
cheating, and possibly in terms of collected
penalties if the latter are monetary) at least
equal its (opportunity) costs.9 A general result
from the literature is that, when he can
commit to audit, the principal can use the
auditor even if it is not ex post optimal,
because it enables him to prevent cheating
ex ante. Indeed, a characteristic of optimal
audit contracts—when the principal can
commit to a certain audit probability—is that
audit deters cheating, so that the principal
knows that the agent has chosen to behave
loyally and, therefore, ex post audit is a pure
cost (not associated with a direct benefit).
However, when the principal cannot commit
to an audit strategy, the decision to audit ex
post is taken only if the principal expects to
collect some penalty, to compensate for the
cost of audit.10 Various measures may be used
to make the audit commitment credible. The
most relevant for our purpose are legal
commitments (for instance, if the Organic
Law requires the Ministry of Finance to
perform specific audits) and repeated
relationship considerations (the principal
could be tempted not to audit at the end of
one period, but this would harm him in
future periods by reducing the credibility of
the audit threat).
From the agent’s perspective, if the size
of the expected penalty—that is, the
discounted penalty times the probability of
it being imposed—is high enough, the threat
is sufficient to prevent him from cheating. A
traditional result from the literature is that,
when the penalty is high enough, audit is
optimal and sufficient to deter cheating. In
developed countries, expected penalties can
indeed act as a serious deterrent. For
example, in France, the system of mise en débet
means that agents of the Ministry of Finance
are financially and personally responsible
for the wrongdoing they are supposed to
prevent. As their salary is comparatively high
and the judicial system is performing well,
the threat is taken seriously. On the contrary,
the same seriousness may not apply in Pacific
island countries, where salaries in the civil
service are often very low to start with, and
where various factors limit the possibility of
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enforcing public agents’ financial
responsibility. The legal and judicial systems
may be performing poorly; the size of
penalties is usually low (all the more so if
discounted at a high rate); there may be a
shortage of skilled auditors; the opportunity
cost of audit may be comparatively higher;
and various cultural factors may prevent the
prosecution of public agents (who are often
relatives of those whose duty it is to enforce
the sanctions). For these reasons, the
probability of civil servants being caught
cheating and prosecuted may be very low in
Pacific island countries, so that expected
penalties are negligible—and, as a result, the
value of ex post audits as a deterrent threat is
very limited.11 As long as this is the case,
other tools should be used to control public
agencies and induce them into behaving in
the public interest.
Finally, note that a general result from
the literature is that, when the quality of
audit (in terms of identifying cheating—and
not accusing compelling agents) is too small,
auditors are not used, and other incentive
tools must be relied upon. On the contrary,
when audit is efficient and the penalty is
high, random audits may be optimal (which
means that the threat is sufficient, so that the
principal may economise on the cost of
audit).
In sum, it appears that penalties for
misbehaving public agents are often very low
in Pacific island countries, or rarely enforced.
Therefore, the value of ex post audits is
considerably reduced and other incentive
and control tools should be used.
Collusion between the auditor and the
agent12
An important issue dealt with in the recent
literature on audit is the possibility of
collusion between the auditor and the agent.
That is, where the auditor detects cheating,
the agent could use a bribe incentive so the
auditor would not transmit that information
to the principal, and the two would share
the amount of the avoided penalty. In terms of
PEM systems, collusion may occur between a
series of agents and their respective
supervisors. It is important to understand that
the effects of collusion can extend beyond
cases when it is detected and prosecuted,
because the potential for collusion may cause
the principal to modify the agent’s contract
and, in turn, distort economic activity
(Baiman et al. 1991). In particular, the
traditional result that audit is always
optimal when the penalty is high enough is
no longer valid when collusion may occur.
There is also more cheating when collusion
needs to be deterred.
The principal can prevent collusion in
several ways: granting the auditor a reward
when cheating is detected and reported (the
‘carrot’ strategy); threatening the auditor
with a credible punishment—for instance, if
another auditor is sent, or if external signals
may reveal collusion and act as a collusion-
deterring threat (the ‘stick’ strategy); reduce
the stake of collusion (the penalty) and thus
the potential bribe; and increase the trans-
action costs of side-contracting (Kofman and
Lawarrée 1993; Laffont and Rochet 1997).
A critical result from the literature is that,
even if corrupt, an auditor may still be useful
to the principal if transformed into a ‘bounty
hunter’ (that is, the auditor would be granted
the total amount of the agent’s penalty,
which is also the maximum bribe level),
because this would increase the cost of
cheating for the agent. According to the
situation, it may be optimal for the principal
to deter collusion, notably when the agent’s
punishment (and thus potential bribe and
reward) is small. On the other hand, it may
be preferable to allow some collusion (and
save on associated incentives), notably when
the agent’s punishment is higher (Kofman
and Lawarrée 1996). However, this ‘carrot’
solution to deter collusion may not be
adaptable to PEM settings.
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In PEM settings, deterring collusion
between, for instance, an internal supervisor
and an agent, could be better achieved
through sending in supposedly more honest
external auditors. Kofman and Lawarrée
(1993) provide such a model, where the
external auditor costs more than the internal
one, but never colludes. They show that the
strategy of sending the external auditor after
the internal one, dominates that of sending
the external auditor alone. Their results
suggest that the external auditor’s role is
explained by collusion-deterrence. This
result appears valid, all the more so when
considering that external auditors might
have less information than internal ones. The
optimal auditing policy would thus result
from a trade-off between the low-cost,
accurate information of the internal auditor,
and the high-cost external auditor with
poorer information, but free from collusion.13
Note that, within individual Pacific island
countries, it may be questioned whether it is
possible to find a truly external auditor. A
solution could be found in ‘pooling’ external
auditors for the whole Pacific region, and
sending auditors to countries they do not
originate from.
The threat of collusion may have even
worse effects when the principal cannot
commit to auditing. In that case, an increase
in the penalty for the agent (which may be
seen as a penalty on cheating) is more
effective than an increase in the penalty of
the auditor (which may be seen as a penalty
on collusion). But if there is no collusion cost
in such a situation, auditing may not be
effective (Khalil and Lawarrée 2003).
It has been argued that in many Pacific
island countries penalties for misbehaving
are very low or rarely enforced. This could
be good news, if it means that the stake of
collusion between agents and auditors is low,
so that collusion will not be a major concern.
However, a particularity of PEM systems
deals with our interpretation of cheating as
possibly encompassing some corruption—
and not solely in reducing effort as in most
traditional principal-agent models.
Therefore, one could argue that the collusion
stake (and thus the bribe) can be extended
beyond the agent’s penalty to include part of
the rent captured through corruption. For
instance, if the auditor discovers that a public
agent has diverted funds for his private
benefit, the auditor could blackmail the agent
and agree not to report, provided she receives
some part of the diverted funds. In a ‘repeated
game’ framework, by regularly bribing the
auditor, the agent would be able to keep his
position. Collusion would therefore still be
an important issue in Pacific island
countries, and principal-agent models should
thus be adapted to take account of that
possibility.
The choice of the variable to be audited
Principal-agent models have been used to
compare the value of auditing different kinds
of variables, in particular the choice between
input and output monitoring. For instance,
Khalil and Lawarrée (1995) show that the
principal prefers input monitoring when he
is the residual claimant for the output. Where
there is both moral hazard and adverse
selection, Kessler (2000) suggests that it is
strictly better for the principal to audit the
agent’s actions rather than the agent’s report
on his private information. However, the
results from these models are very dependent
upon their assumptions—which reduces
their practical applicability—or, at least,
calls for caution in using them in a PEM
context. In particular, models rarely take
account of the fact that, in reality, information
is costly (in addition to being imperfect).
Therefore, they are not suitable for
comparing, say, line item versus performance
budgeting, which are associated with very
different information bases.
Nevertheless, an important result, which
is relevant for PEM, is the following. Kofman
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and Lawarrée (1996) show that when there
are several performance measures to screen
the agents and provide incentives, the
principal could gain by choosing ex post
which variables will be monitored. Indeed,
if it is costly for the agent to mimic signals
that do not reflect the actual situation (be it
on its inputs or outputs), increasing the
number of signals raises the agent’s cost of
misrepresenting reality. Therefore, when
signals are costly, the principal can save on
auditing cost by only observing a subset of
signals, while deriving benefit from all of
them. In the basic model, it is optimal to
monitor both input and output randomly, but
input monitoring is used more frequently
(because the agent can capture more rent
under output monitoring). If the available
instruments are associated with different
costs or efficiency, one has to take it into
account; but the main message from the
model remains, that is, the principal benefits
from an increase in the dimension of the
signalling space.
The value of ex ante controls
Principal-agent models have also been
used to compare the value of different
supervision timings, that is, comparing
monitoring (supervision at the moment
when the agent performs actions) versus
auditing (supervision after actions have
been performed). Strausz (2006) argues that
if both supervision techniques are equally
efficient, auditing is (weakly) superior when
the principal can commit to a verification
strategy—as auditing can extract additional
information. However, when the principal’s
verification behaviour is non-contractible,
monitoring may be optimal. This model is
interesting to guide intuition, but once again,
it should not be used literally because of its
assumption that both supervisions rely on
the same technology and are thus equally
efficient, which is probably not the case in
reality.
In terms of PEM, the principal (for
instance, the Ministry of Finance) can rely
on a series of monitoring tools or ex ante
controls, such as delegating agents in line
ministries to check financial operations
before they take place, or automatic
safeguards like computerised systems
checking appropriations before allowing
expenditure. We have already argued that in
many Pacific island countries ex post audits
are probably not very efficient as a
deterrent—hence, ex ante controls may be
more effective, at least as long as judicial
systems are performing poorly. For instance,
placing financial comptrollers within
spending agencies could prevent the latter
from being corrupt. Leruth and Paul (2006)
interpret ex ante controls as increasing the
cost of cheating (or the transaction costs of
corruption) for the agent, and assess the value
of these controls by comparing their cost to
their ability of deterring cheating.
Several arguments play in favour of
relying on ex ante controls in situations such
as those faced in Pacific island countries.
First, ex ante controls may be more effective
in preventing cheating, as they act directly
and do not rely on external enforcement
mechanisms. Second, financial comptrollers
placed within spending agencies probably
have access to most ‘internal’ information,
which is not the case for external auditors.
However, in reality, they are also strategic
actors, so that the issue of collusion may also
arise, and should be prevented—be it through
‘sticks’, ‘carrots’, or the limitation of their
discretionary power. Moreover, ex ante
controls may be quite costly as they may
involve not only a direct cost, but also
indirect economic costs, if they slow down
the expenditure process. At the bottom line,
as Leruth and Paul (2006) explain it, the
principal should not increase controls above
the point where their total costs equal their
benefits, in terms of reducing cheating. When
used together with ex post audits, the optimal
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combination of controls should seek to
equalise their relative efficiency.
Other incentive tools
When audits are not efficient, the principal-
agent theory predicts that the optimal
contract is the second-best one, which grants
an informational rent to ‘efficient’ agents to
induce them into producing more (in turn,
this reduces the required production of
‘inefficient’ agents, compared to optimal
effort levels, in order to decrease the rent). As
already mentioned, in PEM, informational
rents may be understood as performance
premiums, granted in addition to the
compensation for the agent’s effort. Models
with audits (for example, Kofman and
Lawarrée 1993) show that in many situations
(depending on exogenous parameters) the
optimal contract encompasses a combination
of audit and informational rents.
In terms of PEM, informational rents can
be envisaged in a performance budgeting
system, where spending agencies are offered
contracts which specify that a certain level
of output must be reached with a global
appropriation, and can choose the approp-
riate mix of inputs (as is the case in New
Zealand, for instance). In such a situation,
the Ministry of Finance could grant line
ministries quite large transfers to induce
them to produce a high level of output. By
comparison, an input-based budgeting
system typically allows for compensation of
inputs—among which is the agent’s effort—
but not to grant additional rents.
As informational rents often constitute
part of the optimal contract, this could
apparently plead in favour of installing
performance budgeting systems. But this
would miss two critical points. First, the cost
and capacity requirements for setting up and
sustaining a performance budgeting system
may be very high: all the more so in resource-
constrained environments such as Pacific
island countries. Second, most principal-
agent models are based on the strong
assumption that the output is perfectly
observable, at no cost, by the principal. This of
course does not reflect the reality at all. On the
contrary, public agencies ‘outputs’ are
typically difficult to measure, and potential
(imperfect) measures are probably manipulable
by the agent. It is only when these problems
can be solved at a reasonable cost that
performance budgeting may be useful.
As a consequence, basing the choice of a
PEM system on the blind application of
traditional principal-agent models, without
taking account of the existing context, is to
be vehemently proscribed. The principal-
agent theory is useful in guiding intuition,
but should be complemented by an accurate
identification of existing constraints and
practical problems that may occur during
implementation.
Finally, the principal-agent theory may
also be used to assess the value of other
possible PEM reforms aimed at reducing
agency costs (in particular, through reducing
the agents’ informational advantage) in
indirect ways. For instance, such reforms
could be targeted at improving the audit
technology (that is, the quality of control), at
generally improving information systems
(because information can potentially provide
‘external signals’ and act as a deterrent
threat to corruption), or increasing the
economic resilience (indeed, the agent’s
informational advantage partially stems
from uncertainty over external productivity
factors). The decision on which reform to be
implemented should be based upon a cost-
benefit analysis, that is, comparing the cost
of the planned reform with its benefits in
terms of improving the public outcome.
Limits of principal-agent theory
Principal-agent theory may provide
interesting insights to guide the design of
PEM systems, but it has inherent limits. We
have already insisted on the importance of
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taking account of realistic constraints when
interpreting the results of the models
(notably, the lack of effectiveness of the
judicial system) and when considering
implementation (notably, hard budget
constraints, lack of capacities or the
possibility of the agent manipulating output
measures). But in some instances, additional
constraints (compared to those found in
traditional models) may be so binding that it
is not possible to provide agents with
appropriate incentives so that they will
behave in the principal’s interests. For
instance, it may be the case that the judicial
system performs so poorly that ex post audits
are inefficient, that ex ante controls have
reached their limits (that is, they are unable
to prevent cheating at a reasonable cost), and
that it is impossible to grant agents
informational rents (for instance, in an input-
based budgeting system, or if tight cash
constraints prevent it). In such a situation,
the principal has no effective tool to meet the
agent’s incentive compatibility constraint.
One could even imagine a situation where
the agent’s participation constraint is not
met through its official compensation (for
instance, if public wages are very low, or if a
spending agency’s appropriation is not
sufficient to cover its costs). In such a case,
the agent’s participation could only be
ensured through an implicit contract
tolerating a certain degree of rent capture.
If traditional incentives fail, as in the
example above, the principal-agent theory is
of no help. However, Dabla-Norris and Paul
(2006) argue that under such circumstances,
acting on factors usually considered as
exogenous—in particular transparency and
relevant information diffusion, together with
the means to use it—may help relax some
constraints and, as a result, contribute to
improved public outcomes. This argument
is based on the idea that besides official
accountability systems (say, vis-à-vis the
Parliament, the Ministry of Finance, or other
official bodies), public agents are subject to
informal, ‘indigenous’ accountability
mechanisms, vis-à-vis the general population.
That is, the population will tolerate a certain
degree of rent capture on the part of public
officials (because of redistribution concerns),
but on the condition that at least a certain
level of public outcome is produced. If that
assumption reflects reality, increased
transparency in public affairs could raise the
population’s requirements in terms of public
services, thus relying on informal account-
ability systems to improve public outcomes.
Conclusion
It has been argued that principal-agent
theory may be useful in designing efficient
and adaptable PEM systems. This article has
mostly tried to adapt traditional supervision
models to PEM concerns (in particular, the
control of spending agencies through ex post
audits and/or ex ante controls and/or
performance premiums), taking account of
Pacific island country specificities. This
situation calls for taking account of
additional constraints compared to those
encountered in the theoretical literature, such
as the lack of effectiveness of official
enforcement mechanisms and tight budget
constraints. As Pacific island countries are
confronted by a shortage of human and
financial resources, it is particularly
important to conceive efficient systems and
to undertake reforms only if their expected
benefits (in terms of increased effectiveness)
at least equal their total costs (including
‘hidden’ costs due to the high opportunity
cost of scarce skilled human resources).
Revamping PEM systems in Pacific island
countries is of course not achievable in a
single step, because it would involve
diverting all staff from their day-to-day
necessary tasks (and it could not be
delegated to external consultants, because of
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the lack of ownership and sustainability as
well as budget constraints). Therefore, PEM
reforms ought to start from the functional
(though non-optimal) systems and consist
of incremental measures, doable at the
margin. They should be based on existing
capacities and aimed at improving most
badly needed shortfalls in a sequenced way.
The models presented above should be
used with caution, especially at the
implementation stage. For instance, the
principal-agent theory generally assumes
that output is publicly observable at no cost—
which is totally unrealistic in the public
sector. It would thus be misleading to follow
the recommendations from the theory blindly
(say, relying on sole performance premiums
to try and replicate the theoretical second-
best contract) without taking account of the
cost, imperfections, and manipulability of
information. Moreover, the implementation
stage comes with its own problems. For
instance, if a reform aims to reduce rent
capture from civil servants, and the latter
have to implement the reform, it is common
sense that they will try to make it fail.
Adequate incentives must be given to
implementing agents for reforms to succeed.
Following are the main lessons from the
theoretical framework presented, which can
help in sequencing PEM reforms.
• It is clearly demonstrated that, as long
as the judicial system is performing
poorly, ex post audits do not present a
sufficient threat to deter cheating (and
corruption). Therefore, reforms aimed at
improving the quality of audit techniques
are useless, and their cost should be
avoided.
• In theory, performance premiums may
provide agencies with self-enforcing
incentive schemes, however, in practice,
it may not be possible to grant such
premiums in some PEM settings (say,
line-item budgeting) and, more
importantly, such schemes entail the risk
of manipulation (if the agency can alter
the performance measure) and may be
very costly. Adopting performance-
oriented schemes can thus be useful only
if managed with care, notably if there
exists reliable (and not too costly)
performance measures (see Robinson
(forthcoming) on these issues).
• Starting from a case where ex post audits
are ineffective and performance premiums
are not possible (or entail the risk of
manipulation), the control of public
agencies should probably rely on ex ante
controls (like automatic safeguards on
expenditure or financial comptrollers
delegated within spending agencies).
However, they may not be efficient
enough to deter cheating—and it would
be wrong to increase them beyond their
efficiency limit, that is, the point where
their benefits (in terms of reduced
cheating) equal their costs.
• In a situation where traditional incentives
fail, we have argued that one could rely
on informal accountability mechanisms.
Increasing transparency and providing
means to use information for all
constituencies, would help mobilise these
accountability mechanisms.
• In the meantime, PEM reforms should be
targeted at ‘getting the basics right’
(Schick 1997), that is, improving the
functioning of the basic PEM tools ( for
example, line-item budgeting processes,
accountancy, internal controls aimed at
first ensuring fiscal discipline). Among
these, a crucial point is to improve the
information basis, not only to facilitate
informal accountability mechanisms but
also to prepare the field for resorting to
external accountability systems and
performance-oriented schemes—which
both crucially need good information. In
Pacific island country settings, a
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minimum (and urgent) device of
information exchange could be to
connect all relevant agents (even those
in remote islands) to the Internet, and
require them to regularly send financial
information in order to centralise it.
• It is only when basic tools are performing
well that more decentralised manage-
ment systems, with external and ex post
accountability mechanisms, should be
envisaged. (In the same vein, Schick
(1998:127–9) states that ‘[i]t would be
foolhardy to entrust public managers
with complete freedom over resources
when they have not yet internalised the
habit of spending public money according
to prescribed rules’, and that ‘[n]o
country should move directly from an
informal public sector to one in which
managers are accorded enormous
discretion to hire and spend as they see
fit’.) Indeed, when official accountability
mechanisms perform reasonably well,
relying on ex post control can be very
efficient (as it does not weigh on the
expenditure process, and is used only
according to needs and not in a
systematic manner like ex ante controls).
• If ex post audits are used, the decision on
what type of auditor to use should be
based on a trade-off between internal
auditors, who are probably better
informed but more likely to collude with
agents, and external auditors, who have
less knowledge of the local situation but
have less room to collude. Note however,
that within individual Pacific island
countries, it may be questioned whether
it is possible to find a truly external
auditor. A solution could be found in
‘pooling’ external auditors for the whole
Pacific region and sending auditors to
countries that are not their home
countries. This could be facilitated, for
instance, by the recent creation of the
Pacific Islands Financial Management
Association (PIFMA). Another solution
may be to rely on donor agencies’ own
auditors.14
Finally, principal-agent models may be used
to guide PEM reforms in Pacific island
countries as follows. First, the specificities of
the existing PEM system, together with the
constraints faced in the country, should be
identified (among other things, the number
and skills of the existing labour force, the level
of centralisation of the functional PEM
system, the existence of a Court of Audit, the
capacities and performance of the judicial
system for example). Second, an adequate
theoretical framework should be designed,
according to the ultimate objective searched
for (for instance, increasing the production
of some public services, or reducing the cost
of the public expenditure process). Then,
possible implementation problems (and
associated measures) should be identified;
and finally an operational plan of reform
should be designed and carried out.
Notes
1 For a good technical introduction to principal-
agent theory, see Laffont and Martimort
(2002). As the authors state, neoclassical
economics postulates rational individual
behaviour in the market, and thus profit
maximisation for firms and exogenous
market prices. Yardstick competition
provides firms with effective incentives for
cost minimisation (and thus solves adverse
selection problems), and the fixed price
contract associated with exogenous prices
provides consumers with appropriate
incentives for maximising their utility levels
(thus solving moral hazard problems).
However, treating the firm as a black box
proved to be rather limiting, and economists
turned to the study of how to manage
information flows and to provide the
appropriate incentives to individuals within
the firm. Moreover, markets fail for public
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goods and public intervention is therefore
necessary. This poses the problem of
designing mechanisms for collective
decisions, which must solve the incentive
problem of acquiring the private information
that agents have about their preferences for
public goods. The theory of incentives thus
emerged from the need for dealing with
situations where markets are imperfect and
information is asymmetric, whether in the
private or public sector (Laffont and
Martimort 2002:1–17).
2 Notably, if private information remains
constant over a repeated game framework,
the optimal long-term contract is the replica
of the one-shot (static) optimal contract
(Laffont and Martimort 2002).
3 In aid-recipient countries, another agency
relationship is to be found between donors
and the recipient government (see Paul
2006a).
4 This interpretation allows one to link the
principal-agent approach with the empirical
literature on corruption. Indeed, the latter
identifies various factors contributing to
corruption, among which the overall level of
potential benefits from corrupt behaviour,
the cost of bribery (including penalties and
sanctions), and the bargaining power and
extent of discretionary powers of the various
actors (Chand and Moene 1999). These factors
are equivalent to those pointed out by the
principal-agent literature.
5 In the remainder of the article, we mainly
use the general term ‘cheating’ to refer to all
these negative actions.
6 Aid constitutes a large proportion of
government expenditure in most Pacific
island countries, with an aid to GDP ratio of
more than 20 per cent and sometimes as high
as 70–80 percent (see the various Pacific island
country reports on www.imf.org).
7 Note that the conclusions drawn are limited
to simple principal-agent models. More
elaborate models, notably those relying on
game theory, have also been applied to
particular PEM issues. These are not dealt
with here. See, notably, Ahmad et al. (2002)
and Ahmad and Martinez (2004) on the
delegation of targeted expenditure programs
to sub-national governments.
8 The main sources for this subsection are
Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) and Leruth and
Paul (2006).
9 Note that this is true whatever type of auditor
is used: internal auditors, a Court of Audit or
private auditing firms.
1 0 As an extreme case, this means that when
the principal cannot commit to audit and the
penalty is very low, or non-monetary, the
principal should not audit at all.
1 1 While ‘formal’ penalties for cheating and rent
capture may be very low, some informal
sanctions may be taken more seriously and
act in favour of rent capture. Think of the
pressure for redistribution exerted by civil
servants’ relatives. As Mummert (2002)
expresses it, for de jure reforms to be effective,
legal sanctions must be strong enough to
penetrate the inhibitive layer of informal non-
legal sanctions.
1 2 The literature on collusion in three-tier
hierarchies has been developed following
Tirole (1986).
1 3 Notwithstanding different types of auditors,
Laffont and Martimort (1999) also show that
one way to reduce collusion is to divide up
supervision among several supervisors, so
as to introduce a coordination problem
among them. However, that solution may
be costly in practice, and therefore not
efficient in Pacific island settings.
1 4 It should be recalled that reforms prompted
by external conditionality, and not owned by
recipient constituencies, have often proved
to perform poorly. On the contrary,
conditionality may serve as a commitment
technology to support reforms initiated by a
committed government.
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